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Naturalising Representational Content
Nicholas Shea*
King’s College London
Abstract
This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates
one approach to naturalising content – to giving a naturalistic account of what makes an entity a
representation and in virtue of what it has the content it does. It argues for pluralism about the
metaphysics of content and suggests that a good strategy is to ask the content question with
respect to a variety of predictively successful information processing models in experimental psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience; and hence that data from psychology and cognitive neurosci-
ence should play a greater role in theorising about the nature of content. Finally, the contours of
the view are illustrated by drawing out and defending a surprising consequence: that individuation
of vehicles of content is partly externalist.
The contents list is as follows:
1 The Project of Naturalising Representational Content
2 The Explanatory Role of Content
3 Existing Theories
4 Pluralism
5 Externalist Syntax
6 Conclusion
1. The Project of Naturalising Representational Content
Some things in the world have semantic properties. Spoken and written sentences are
paradigm cases. They are perfectly ordinary particulars in the causal order: ink marks on
the page and vibrations in the air. But they also have more exotic properties: they can be
true or false, or, in the case of imperatives, they can be satisfied, or go unsatisfied. That
is, they are associated with a condition, and it makes an important explanatory difference
whether that condition actually obtains, comes to obtain, or fails to obtain. Thoughts too
have semantic properties in this way, and on all naturalistic views of the mind the seman-
tic properties of thoughts are also associated with ordinary physical particulars: either
whole people, or things going on within people, almost certainly involving processes in
the brain.
In the 19th Century Franz Brentano identified the closely-related idea of intentionality
and argued that it is a peculiar feature of thoughts (Brentano 1874 ⁄1995). Thoughts can
be about objects and properties that are not present to the thinker, that are distant in time
and space, that are hypothetical or may only be actualised far in the future, or that are
entirely imaginary. If thinking is a physical process realised by or within people, how
then can thoughts reach out and be about such things? Indeed, even when the object is
right in front of me, how does my perception and thought manage to be about it,
when the object is out there and the thought is in here (in some metaphorical sense)? A
perfectly ordinary feature of everyday life – the fact that sentences and thoughts have
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semantic properties – can come to seem mysterious and in need of explanation. There
are many kinds of philosophical theory that would offer some explanatory purchase on
the phenomenon, but a naturalistic account of representational content, if it were avail-
able, would dispel any sense that intentionality is mysterious or lies outside the familiar
causal order of natural objects and properties.
Although some have attempted to derive the content of utterances directly from the
behavioural dispositions of speakers and listeners (Millikan 2004; ch. 8; Skyrms 2010), this
paper will assume that linguistic content depends at least in part on the thoughts of those
communicating (Grice 1957; Lewis 1969). If so, we cannot start with public language
sentences. Attempts to naturalise intentionality of all kinds will depend upon being able
to naturalise mental content.
The label ‘naturalising mental content’ has become associated with relatively stringent
assumptions about how a theory must relate mental properties to non-mental properties if
it is to count as naturalistic. I simply follow that usage, leaving aside the important ques-
tion of whether other accounts of how the mental relates to the non-mental also qualify
as forms of naturalism (Hornsby 1997). So I will take it that a naturalistic account of
mental content must provide illuminating explanatory connections between representa-
tional content and properties that are non-semantic, non-mental and non-normative. Fur-
thermore, it must show that content properties supervene on the physical, or at least
must be compatible with such supervenience. Reduction is one live option (especially for
some varieties of representational content – see below), but the naturalising project is not
limited to reductive theories. It is a familiar point that many special sciences deal in prop-
erties that are not reducible to basic physics. What makes them naturalistic is that their
properties have substantive explanatory connections to properties in other sciences; and
that they supervene on the physical. Non-reductive physicalism is compatible with the
existence of ceteris paribus bridge laws or robust (but not exceptionless) generalisations
connecting properties from different levels or schemes of explanation. Some kinds of rep-
resentational content may be like that too.
This paper describes one robustly realist approach to naturalising representational
content. The approach underwrites a view about the explanatory role of representa-
tional content, which is set out in section 2. Section 3 mentions some failings of
existing naturalistic theories of content and section 4 draws a pluralist moral: that the
metaphysics of content – what makes it the case that a representation has the content
it does – may be different in different kinds of system, with no shared property that
is plausibly individuative of contentful states in general. Pluralism motivates a research
project that looks at a variety of systems, examining a series of predictively successful
information-processing explanations in detail in order to understand what representa-
tional content must be like for those explanations to work as they do (or not – elim-
inativism remains an option in each case). Section 5 illustrates these views about the
nature and explanatory role of content by drawing out and defending a mildly coun-
terintuitive consequence: that the individuation of vehicles of content is a partly exter-
nalist affair.
In accordance with the brief to be opinionated, the paper is confined to one particular
research strategy for naturalising representational content. While I think there are good
reasons to pursue this approach, I don’t take it to be the only option. On the basis of our
present state of knowledge other, incompatible approaches cannot be ruled out. The
research programme described here must ultimately be judged by its fruits.
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2. The Explanatory Role of Content
This section sets out a widely-held form of realism about mental representation and
sketches a view about the explanatory role of representational content that is compati-
ble with it. It is the representational realism that has been deployed since the ‘‘cogni-
tive revolution’’ in experimental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and the other
sciences of brain and behaviour. The central insight derives from the invention of
mechanical computers, which gave us the idea that mental representations are physical
particulars that are realized in the brains (and maybe bodies) of thinkers and interact
causally in virtue of non-semantic properties (e.g. ‘‘form’’), in ways that are faithful to
their semantic properties. Psychological processes like thinking, perceiving, reasoning
and imagining then consist of causal processes taking place between representations with
appropriate contents.
Information processing theories effectively offer a wiring diagram showing how inputs
affect states of the system and, in conjunction with other states of the system, issue in
behavioural outputs. What does it add to that wiring diagram to label various nodes with
representational contents? A realist about mental representation is committed to the reality
of the internal particulars described in the theory, and of their contents. Representational-
ists also typically subscribe to the claim that representations interact causally in virtue of
non-semantic properties. If so, a complete causal description of the behaviour of the sys-
tem is available that doesn’t mention semantic properties at all. We can describe how
proximal stimulation at input will cause the system to undergo various internal transitions
that eventuate in movements at output. Intermediate entities at various stages of this pro-
cess have semantic properties, but content does not alter the underlying causal story about
internal transitions and bodily movements.
What adverting to content does achieve, however, is to show how the system connects
with its environment: with the real-world objects and properties with which it is inter-
acting, and with the problem space in which it is embedded. The non-semantic descrip-
tion of the system’s internal organisation is true of the system irrespective of its external
environment. Content ascriptions help explain how it interacts with that environment.
That can sound merely ascriptionist: that content is no more than a useful notation that
makes the system comprehensible to the interpreter, with no further reality in the system.
But representationalism admits of a more strongly realist treatment than that. When a system
is embedded in a particular environment, entities within the system thereby acquire a suite
of new, relational properties. The ‘information’ of information theory is a matter of covaria-
tion, so embedding a system in an environment gives rise to a host of new informational
properties. An input register that could in principle carry information about very many dif-
ferent things now carries information about a much narrower class of conditions. Similarly
there are facts about how entities in the system connect causally at output to distal objects
and properties in the environment; also facts about what the system has been designed or
trained, or has learned or evolved, to do. These are all perfectly un-mysterious natural facts
about the embedded system. Any property that is constructed out of such properties is also
instantiated when the system is embedded in an environment (automatically, as it were). If
content is like that, then something more than mere ascriptionism is true. Content is a real
property of the system, instantiated in part because of the way the system is embedded in its
environment and in part because of the way it is internally configured – a property that is
explanatory of the way the system interacts with its environment.
Instrumentalist uses of representational ascriptions are often available, and are clearly a
naturalistic option. For some systems the intentional stance may even be the whole truth
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about representational content (Dennett 1981), when the way a system operates cannot
be broken down in terms of interacting vehicles of content. But the brand of externalist
realism advocated here, when it is available, has the merit over instrumentalism of saying
something more about how the system manages to perform its task, by appealing to facts
about the internal operation of the system. It’s not just by chance, or through a look-up
table, that the system instantiates a useful input-output function; it does so by deploying
an internal algorithm. The approach also goes beyond a non-semantic or purely internalist
description of a system’s internal operations, in that it labels the internal components with
semantic contents. The external embedding is the task being performed by the system,
the internal algorithm is how it manages to solve that task, and the contents of the inter-
nal items show how an internal organisation of that sort manages to perform the exter-
nally-described task. The properties appealed to in this explanation (mental contents) are
more than mere convenient ascriptions. They are real properties instantiated by parts of
the system. That underpins the force of appealing to these properties to explain the sys-
tem’s behaviour in its environment.
3. Existing Theories
That picture of the explanatory role of representational content sets an agenda for
addressing, but does not itself answer, our question about the nature of content. Nor can
we turn to cognitive science for the answer. Although cognitive science encompasses sev-
eral hugely successful disciplines that rely on representational content as a central explana-
tory resource, they take the existence of semantic properties for granted. They offer no
settled view about what makes it the case that the representations relied on have the con-
tents they do. The content question has been largely left to philosophy, which has made
substantial progress, especially during the 1980s.
Dretske (1981) brought the tools of mathematical information theory to bear on the
issue. Information in that sense is simply a matter of correlation between types: where
the state of one system changes the probability that some other system is in a given state
or states. For example, an elevated firing rate in such-and-such neurons in an organism’s
primary visual cortex raises the probability that a horizontal line is present in its field of
view. Indeed, the discovery of neurons that are differentially sensitive to such visual fea-
tures by Hubel and Wiesel was one of the motivations for an information-theoretic take
on representational content.
Informational accounts have to grapple with the fundamental fact that information in
the correlational sense is ubiquitous. Any putative representational type carries correlational
information about a whole host of natural properties, as well as about less natural rivals like
disjunctive properties or Quinean collections of undetached parts. There is much more to
Dretske’s (1981) theory of content than that of course, but his account of which correla-
tions are constitutive of content and which are not, and those offered by other informa-
tion-based theories of content, have not yet been accepted as fully satisfactory. For
example, it is often felt that they do not have an adequate answer to the ‘disjunction prob-
lem’ – the problem of ruling out strong putative correlations between internal types and
disjunctive conditions, like it’s a fly or a moving black dot. Nor is it at all plausible that the
content of a representation is the thing with which it correlates most strongly. Exceptions
abound. Proximal correlations are often stronger than the distal correlations that are more
plausible candidates for content (e.g. an internal state that roughly correlates with predators
but correlates more tightly with a particular pattern of shadow on the retina). Weaker cor-
relations (e.g. indicating merely a small chance of a predator) are sometimes more plausible
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candidates for content when stronger correlations are available (Godfrey-Smith 1991).
Sophisticated informational theories may ultimately succeed in dealing with these difficul-
ties (e.g. Usher 2001), but the ubiquity of correlational information is a substantial chal-
lenge for purely informational approaches to representational content.
Empirical work on the cognitive psychology of concepts also puts pressure on informa-
tional accounts. The conditions which typically cause the tokening of a given concept
are many and diverse, including objects and properties with which it is connected asso-
ciatively, taxonomically and thematically (Murphy 2004). Words and pictures, rather than
the objects and properties themselves, are frequent causes of concept tokening. Very
often the causes of the tokening of a concept are other thoughts and concepts. Jerry
Fodor, who did so much precisify and elaborate the representational theory of mind, had
the idea that some correlations asymmetrically depend on others (Fodor 1990). That is
fine as far as it goes, but the source of the asymmetric dependence was never explained,
leaving the suspicion that content was the basis of asymmetric dependence rather than
the converse.
This work in cognitive psychology uncovering the relations between different con-
cepts, and between concepts and other psychological states, points in the same direction
as a long-standing idea in philosophy: that relations between representations are important
to fixing their content. For example, content might depend on inferential connections
between representations. As applied to concepts, that leads to conceptual role semantics,
according to which the content of a concept is given by some set of dispositions the thin-
ker has to move between it and other concepts (Block 1986). If all inferences are rele-
vant, holism threatens (Fodor and Lepore 1992): if the identity of concept C is
constituted partly by its inferential connection to concept D, whose identity in turn
depends on its inferential connections to further concepts, then the individuation of C
depends transitively on an entire network of interconnected concepts.
That motivates attempts to identify, for each concept, a privileged subset of dispositions
that are constitutive of its content (Peacocke 1992). However, it has proven difficult to
delineate sets of inferences that can do the job: that are necessary for possessing the con-
cept, plausibly shared by most users of the concept, and sufficiently detailed to be indi-
viduative that is, to distinguish the concept from others. Cognitive psychology has shown
that the dispositions thinkers actually use in deploying concepts seldom have the structure
of definitions. Stored prototypes and exemplars are far more important, together with
wider bodies of knowledge in some cases, like explicit or tacit theories of the domain
(Margolis and Laurence 1999; Murphy 2004). For these reasons, conceptual or inferential
role semantics has not so far had much success in naturalising content, except perhaps for
the logical constants.
Relations amongst representations might be significant for another reason. They endow
a system of representations with a structure, which may then be isomorphic to structures
in the world. For example, the spatial relations amongst symbols on a cartographic map
are roughly isomorphic to spatial relations amongst places on the ground; and that seems
to be crucial to the way maps represent. Research on animal navigation has been a source
of empirical support for the idea that isomorphisms are an important aspect of representa-
tional content (Gallistel 1990), bolstered by neural evidence about the role of the hippo-
campus in spatial navigation and the discovery of hippocampal ‘place cells’ in the rat that
register the animal’s spatial location (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978).1 Cummins has done
much to spell out a way isomorphism might be constitutive of representational content
(Cummins 1989), but that there should be some functional isomorphism between a sys-
tem of representations and the things they represent is such an extremely undemanding
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condition that it has been hard to see how isomorphism, on its own, can account for the
nature of content (Godfrey-Smith 1996; pp. 184–187; Shea forthcoming).
The final important step taken in the 1980s was the development of teleosemantic the-
ories of content (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987). Teleosemantics has two main parts. The
first is to focus on how a representation is used downstream. According to teleosemantics
the content of a representation is fixed in part by the way that it is used by some con-
sumer system that reacts to or relies on the representation. The idea is to read off from
the way the consumer system behaves facts about what the consumer must be taking the
representation to mean. The second part of teleosemantics is to make sense of this talk of
‘a consumer taking a representation to mean something’ in terms of evolutionary func-
tions. That idea applies differently to contents with different directions of fit. Indicative
contents have a mind-to-world direction of fit: the content is correct when the world
actually matches a specified condition. Imperative representations have a world-to-mind
direction of fit: when there is a mismatch, their content is satisfied when the world is
changed to match a specified condition.
The explanation of content in terms of evolutionary functions is most direct in the case
of imperative representations. When a consumer system has been designed by natural
selection to react to a range of different states (putative representations) with a range of
different outputs, those outputs will have evolutionary functions – results that in the evo-
lutionary past led systematically to survival and reproduction of the organism (and hence
that explain why there are instances of that system around today). As well as very general
conditions, for example that the output led to the organism obtaining something benefi-
cial, there are usually outcomes specific to each type of behavioural output that the con-
sumer produces. Empirical work on honeybee foraging provided a classic example. If a
particular honeybee dance pattern is produced in the hive, it is when consumer bees fly
off to a particular location to search for nectar that the behavioural output leads systemat-
ically to survival and reproduction of the hive (the functional output being to fly to a dif-
ferent location for each different pattern of dance). Flying to that location is therefore the
imperative content of the dance.
Indicative content is given, not by output functions, but by conditions that were in
place in order for those outputs to lead to survival and reproduction. As well as very gen-
eral background conditions (e.g. being on the earth), again there are usually conditions
that are specific to each output, and that enter into an explanation of how the output
contributed systematically to survival and reproduction in the evolutionary past. Return-
ing to the bee dance, the condition specific to a particular dance pattern is that there
should be nectar at a particular location, the location dances of that type tended to dis-
pose consumer bees to fly to in the evolutionary past. In this way indicative contents are
success conditions for the behaviour of a consumer system in response to a representation
– where success is naturalised in terms of performing an evolved function.
Teleosemantics helped cut down some of the liberality of correlational information,
but it faced worries of its own about founding content on facts about a system’s history.
A molecule-for-molecule duplicate that was created by chance would behave in just the
same way as an evolved system but, according to teleosemantics, it would have no states
with representational content (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1997). It also remained
unclear how well the theory handles high-level representational states like beliefs and
desires, although the extension to functions based on learning may help here (Dretske
1988; Millikan 1984). Teleosemantics derives considerable support from empirical
work on animal signalling, like the honeybee nectar dance (von Frisch 1967) and the
remarkable experiments on signalling by vervet monkeys about different kinds of predator
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(Seyfarth et al. 1980). In the case of human beliefs and desires, we do not yet have a clear
psychological account of how these representations are consumed in downstream process-
ing. If the ‘consumption’ of beliefs and desires is a general purpose affair, for example
being a matter of how they feed into theoretical and practical inference, then it is less
clear how an appeal to functions will ground the attribution of conditions, specific to
each belief, for the performance of its specific functions (in an evolutionary normal way).
4. Pluralism
So the recent history of attempts to naturalise representational content is a story of many
ideas and no conclusive resolution. Every view faces serious problems as a full and unified
theory of content. Nor is there consensus about which approach is most promising. The
overview pointed at ways in which different lines of empirical evidence motivate and
support different approaches to content. The empirical cases lead in different directions.
In this section I want to suggest that a moral can be drawn from this rather partisan story:
that there may be no one true unified account of the nature of content. The metaphysics
of content may be different in different kinds of representational system.
In a paper on folk psychology Peter Godfrey-Smith argues that folk explanations of
behaviour in terms of mental representations might work for a variety of different reasons
in different cases (Godfrey-Smith 2004). He also observes that cognitive scientists differ
radically amongst themselves as to which of the naturalistic properties discussed
above – correlation, isomorphism, inferential roles, teleofunctional specificity – are most
fundamental to semantic content. He draws a pluralist conclusion: that different semantic
concepts are suited to different circumstances (p. 160).
I want to adopt Godfrey-Smith’s insight. Put in terms of the realist approach to repre-
sentation set out in section 2 above, different kinds of representational property might be
suited to explaining the behaviour of different kinds of system. These different representa-
tional explanations share a commitment to explaining how a system performs some exter-
nally-specifiable task (a function from distal inputs to external outcomes) in terms of the
interaction of various internal components, with content capturing the way those compo-
nents are connected to external circumstances in ways that are useful for performing the
externally-specified task (by correlation, isomorphism, etc.). The relevant connections or
‘exploitable relations’ (Godfrey-Smith 2006) may be different in different cases, as may
the other external factors that make it the case that the system is a representational system
at all. If that is right, pluralism about representational content follows, at least in subper-
sonal systems. There may be no one true unifying theory. What makes it the case that a
representation has the content it does may be different in different kinds of representing
system.
If that is right, then there is a simple diagnosis of why the rapid philosophical progress
on naturalising representational content ground to a halt. Different theories drew support
from different bodies of empirical literature, but none could cover all the cases because
the very nature of the representational content needed to explain the behaviour of differ-
ent kinds of system is different.
Given pluralism about content, we should look at representational explanations of
behaviour in a wide variety of different domains, in order to uncover a variety of kinds
of representational content. Where an information processing theory is successful at pre-
dicting behaviour and supported by evidence about internal states, that raises a prima facie
case that the representations relied on are real, and have the contents relied on in the
theory. That is not to say that philosophers have to take scientists’ theories on trust.
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The scientists may be wrong about what contents are being processed, or about whether
their explanations need appeal to representational content at all. However, we can inves-
tigate whether a given predictively-successful explanation of behaviour really does rely on
representational contents. If it does, that gives us a defeasible reason to think that those
representations in that system have those contents. It is then a defeasible constraint on a
theory of content that, as applied to that system, it should deliver those contents. That is
a way of arriving at contents for a system that is not just based on intuition. Over-reli-
ance on trading intuitions about subpersonal systems like frog retinal ganglion cells was
an unfortunate feature of some earlier philosophical debates about content.
To be more precise, the strategy I am advocating is to examine a variety of representa-
tional explanations, and for each to identify:-
(a) An explanandum concerning how the system operates or behaves in relation to its
environment.
(b) A putative explanation of (a) that relies in part on attributing representational proper-
ties to the system (e.g. keeping track of p, aiming at q, etc.).
(c) An account of how the explanation in (b) succeeds (remaining open to there being no
such account).
(d) If there is a positive answer to (c), a characterisation of the kind of properties the rep-
resentational properties of the system would have to be for the explanation in (b) to
succeed in explaining (a) in accordance with the account (c).
For example, there is a well-confirmed account of the information processing responsible
for subjects’ behaviour when they make a series of rapid choices between options which
are only rewarded probabilistically. Subjects learn by reinforcement and there is now
strong behavioural and neural evidence that they deploy what is called a temporal-differ-
ence learning algorithm (Schultz et al. 1997). This is a field where neural data has played
an important role in deciding between theories. Rival theories postulate different internal
states intermediate between input and behaviour. Mathematical models tell us the quanti-
tative values these intermediates should take, which vary from trial to trial. These quanti-
tative intermediates can be very different according to different information-processing
theories, even when their behavioural outputs are equivalent. The technique of model-
based analysis looks for corresponding trial-by-trial variation in data about neural firing
rates, most often obtained indirectly from the fMRI BOLD signal (Corrado et al. 2009).
This new way of making use of fMRI is considerably more powerful than the standard
subtractive method in uncovering the information processing responsible for various sim-
ple forms of human behaviour, as well as delivering detailed knowledge of how those
representations are realised in the brain. Temporal-difference learning accounts of
reward-guided decision making have had considerable predictive success and have been
very influential in cognitive neuroscience and neuroeconomics. The representational con-
tents they rely on therefore offer a good target for philosophical theories of content (Shea
2012).
To follow this pluralist strategy philosophers will have to look to a wider range of data
from the sciences of brain and behaviour than they have to date. We saw above how
important empirical data has been in motivating different theories of content; data for
example on the correlational information carried by different neural areas, cognitive maps
in the medial temporal lobe, ways that people deploy concepts and functional animal sig-
nalling. If we cast the net even more widely we may uncover further insights about the
types of features that are relevant to content.
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The examples discussed above concern subpersonal level representations (although
some cases do have implications for the personal level: Shea 2013). Personal level con-
tents are available to consciousness and enter into epistemic or reason-giving relations for
the whole person. Subpersonal level contents are not and do not, although they can also
underpin intelligent behaviour. Pluralism about the nature of content as between personal
level representations like beliefs and desires and the several varieties of subpersonal level
contents is especially plausible. Nor should we expect content to be the same kind of
thing in conceptual representations, which have content-bearing constituents, as it is in
non-conceptual representations, which have correctness conditions but lack semantically-
significant constituent structure.
Why, then, should we expect an understanding of content in subpersonal systems to
have any relevance for personal level content? The strategy I advocate is to tackle the
project of naturalising personal level content from below. We start with the simpler cases
to learn more about how content-based explanations work and to catalogue a variety of
content-relevant things that are going on in different systems. The hope is that these
insights will allow us to creep up on the problem of personal level content gradually,
gaining an understanding of increasingly complex systems which have more moving parts
and increasing interactions with personal level phenomena. The complexities of personal
level phenomena like believing and desiring may look more tractable when we have a
better understanding of simpler representational systems with which they are likely to
share many features, especially if the personal-subpersonal distinction is not an unbridge-
able ontological or explanatory divide.
5. Externalist Syntax
To illustrate the way internal and external factors conspire to give rise to content accord-
ing to this form of externalist realism, I will draw out and defend a mildly revisionary
consequence of the framework: a form of externalism about syntax. Whether a system has
the kind of realist externalist contents discussed above depends in part on its environmen-
tal embedding. That is in tension with the idea that there is a syntactic description of the
internal causal operation of a representational system that is completely independent of
features of the environment. Amongst other things, a syntactic description enumerates the
vehicle types. A consequence of the view expressed above is that whether a causal
description of the operation of a system counts as a syntactic description depends in part on
the system’s environment. Often a reasonably complex system is suited to implementing
more than one algorithm or computational process, without altering the internal workings
of the system. Which of those counts as a syntactic description will depend on which task
environment the system is embedded in. That runs contrary to a widespread assumption
that, even if semantic externalism is tenable, syntax is a wholly internalist affair.
For example, Fodor claims that ‘computational [states] are individuated by their local
properties’ (and are syntactic items: Fodor 1994, p. 14). Internalist syntax was also presup-
posed in the debate over whether the explanatory properties relied upon by psychology
are or must be externalist (Davies 1991; Egan 1991; Segal 1991). A few authors since
have questioned that assumption (discussed below), but other than those who adopt the
vehicle externalism of the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), inter-
nalism about syntax remains the orthodoxy. The radical vehicle externalism of the
extended mind hypothesis is not the issue we are considering here, because our vehicles
of content are entities that are parts of the system in question, in a way that extended
mind hypothesis rejects. Our question is rather whether the fact that an internal state is a
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syntactic item at all could in principle depend upon which environment the system is
located in.
There may be strong constraints on which kinds of systems could be implementations
of particular syntactically-described operations (cf. Sprevak 2010), for example that could
implement the first-order predicate calculus. But we are working with a conception of
representational processing that encompasses any system that makes transformations
between vehicles in a way that is faithful to their semantic properties, where ‘faithfulness’
can include inductive and abductive inferences, and inferences that reflect merely local
statistical regularities. Very many physical systems are capable of implementing some such
transitions. Conversely, a reasonably complex physical system is capable of implementing
content-faithful transitions in more than one way (example below). Rather than saying
vehicles of content are absolutely ubiquitous, the framework above makes it a substantive
constraint on being a syntactic item that an internal representation stands in the right rela-
tions to the system’s environment to bear (externalist) content.
An example motivates the idea that a system could be divided up into vehicles of con-
tent in more than one way, with the appropriate way depending in part on the context
in which the system is embedded (Shagrir 2001 provides another example). Consider a
system that operates as shown in Fig. 1. It takes areas or blobs as input and transforms
them into areas at output. For example, the inputs and outputs could be illuminated areas
on a touch screen. We assume the inputs and outputs are sufficiently fine-grained that
we can treat them as continuous; or we could imagine the system implemented by physi-
cally manipulating volumes of fluid, which would be practically continuous. Suppose too
that the way the system is connected to its task environment is appropriate to make it the
case that its internal intermediates have content.
The operations the system performs are as follows. The input screen is divided into two
different sections, Input 1 and Input 2. The system counts the number of shapes in Input
2 and divides the area of each shape in Input 1 into that number of parts. It does the con-
verse to each shape in Input 2. That produces the two intermediate stages illustrated in
Fig. 1, which both have a number of shapes equal to the number in Input 1 multiplied by
Intermed.1 Intermed.2 OutputInput 1 Input 2
Fig. 1. A hypothetical system with at least two possible syntactic descriptions.
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the number in Input 2. Finally, the system merges each shape in Intermed. 1 with a shape
in Intermed. 2 to form an output shape with the combined area of the two.
The system is contrived so that there are two equally-good ways of describing its oper-
ation. Most obviously, it multiplies the number of shapes in Input 1 by the number of
shapes in Input 2 and represents the product by the number of shapes at Output. Less
obviously, it adds the total surface area at Input 1 to the total surface area at Input 2 and
represents the result by the total surface area at Output. Which calculation is the system
performing?
According to the framework offered here, the answer depends on how the system is
embedded in a problem space. Perhaps it is being used to calculate the amount of ink
one would need in order to print the two patterns of shapes presented as input, with the
colour density delivered at output providing an at-a-glance representation of the total ink
required. Or it could be used as a simple touch-based multiplier to teach multiplication
to young children. In the first case the system is an adder; in the second a multiplier.
Both inputs and outputs differ in content depending on the case: the outputs represent
continuous volume in the first case and discrete integers in the second. The representa-
tional content of the intermediate states also varies. In the first case, Intermed. 1 repre-
sents the total area of Input 1, and Intermed. 2 the total area of Input 2. In the second
case, Intermed. 1 represents the product of the numbers of shapes in Input 1 and Input
2, as does Intermed. 2.
In this example, it is not just that different contents arise in the two different embed-
dings. The very way states of the system are divided up into vehicles of content differs
between the two cases. The divisions between different blobs, which is crucial to the sys-
tem’s implementing multiplication, is irrelevant to the way the system adds areas. And
the fine-grained differences in area which constitute different vehicles in the adder all
count as instances of the same vehicle in the multiplier if they fall within the same blob.
That is, the appropriate syntactic description of the system’s operation depends on the
problem space in which it is embedded.
Although it is still standardly assumed that vehicle individuation and syntax are intrinsic
to a system, the kind of moderate externalism about vehicles advocated here follows an
established line of thought. In particular, Shagrir (2001) draws on the kinds of consider-
ation set out above to argue that content externalism implies what he calls computational
externalism: that which syntactic structures are implemented by a system depends in part
on factors external to the system. (Horowitz 2007) follows Shagrir in arguing for what
Horowitz calls ‘wide computational properties’. (Crane 1990) argues that internal states
cannot be syntactic unless they also have semantics, against some computation-based
accounts of the individuation of syntax, but does not go on to draw externalist conclu-
sions. (Bontley 1998) argues that the appropriate syntactic description of a system may
depend on its design or teleofunction, so he subscribes to an historically-based externalism
about syntactic types.
How does this square with the commonly held view that the individuation of vehicles
of content should depend only on local properties, not on facts external to the system
(Fodor 1994, pp. 14–15)? Can representationalism survive the loosening of that view?
The additional commitment that distinguishes representationalism from instrumentalism is
that vehicles of content should be real material entities, that interact in virtue of their
non-semantic properties. What explanatory advantage does that commitment secure?
As we’ve seen, it allows us to explain how a system manages to implement a given
input-output function, by showing that it implements an algorithm that breaks that
function down into a series of steps. Without realism about the vehicles described in the
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algorithm, the algorithm is no more than an instrumentally-useful way of describing the
input-output function being performed.
When the system does indeed have an internal organisation that corresponds to an algo-
rithm for performing an input-output function, an additional predictive and explanatory
benefit follows. We get to predict a certain kind of stability and characteristic pattern of
change. Representations are likely to be gained and lost piecemeal. So we can explain the
system’s representational stability over time in terms of the persistence of internal vehicle
types which bear those contents; and we can explain the piecemeal gain and loss of repre-
sentations (like acquiring a new belief) in terms of the internal change implementing a
corresponding change to vehicle types. Furthermore, an error at one step in the algorithm
is likely to affect all and only downstream processing that relies on that step.
Vehicle individuation need not be entirely internalist to secure these advantages. What
representationalism requires is that vehicle types correspond to real internally-specifiable
types. That is consistent with the view that which internally-specifiable types are vehicle
types depends in part on factors external to the system; in particular, in our case, on
which division into internal vehicle types corresponds to an algorithm for performing
the input-output function in which it is embedded. Representationalism only requires
that there should be intrinsic properties of the system that sort tokens into vehicles.
Where the contentful explanation of the system’s behaviour appeals to the same repre-
sentation, the syntactic account should have vehicles with the same internally-specifiable
properties. Accordingly, the kind of moderate externalism about vehicle individuation
advocated here is consistent with securing the explanatory benefits that realism about
representation has over instrumentalism.
6. Conclusion
Progress towards naturalising representational content may be achieved by aiming to
account for the representational contents presupposed by well-confirmed scientific theo-
ries that appeal to information-processing to explain behaviour. In pluralist spirit, we
should not assume that the nature of content will be the same in every case. Although
we constrain our theories of content through the lens of the explanatorily useful, that is
consistent with representations being real internal entities interacting in virtue non-
semantic properties, and contents being real, partly-relational properties of those vehicles.
The resulting moderate externalism about vehicle individuation still secures the explana-
tory benefits of realism about representational content.
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1 Hippocampal place cells are evidence of correlation rather than isomorphism, but combined with other evidence
on spatial navigation abilities and the role of the hippocampus and wider medial temporal lobe, it has been sug-
gested that these cells play a role in forming a wider ‘cognitive map’ that is indeed isomorphic to spatial features of
the environment.
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